Apr 22 1825 Court of King's Bench, Robinson v. Mears - Cumberland and Westmorland Newspaper Transcriptions

Apr 22 1825 Court of King's Bench, Robinson v. Mears

The Times, Friday, Apr 22, 1825; pg. 4; Issue 12634; col A

                                         LAW REPORT.
                                           -------------
     COURT OF KING'S BENCH, WESTMINSTER, APRIL 21.

                                 ROBINSON V. MEARS.

This was an action for money had and received, tried before Mr. Justice HOLROYD
at the last assizes at Carlisle. The plaintiff sought to recover the sum of 25L.
deposited by him in the hands of the defendant as a stakeholder, on two wagers
made by him with a gentleman named KILKINSON at the Carlisle races, on two
horses entered for the course, one wager being a bet of 20L. to 30L., and the
other of 5L. to 5L., on the same event. A dispute arising as to which party was
the winner, the plaintiff demanded his money after the race, and while it still
remained in the hands of the defendant, who declined to pay any sum unless in
the presence of all parties. At the trial it was objected on the part of the
defendant, that the learned Judge ought not to try the cause, as the subject
matter was unfit to occupy the time of a court of justice, and the case of
"EGERTON v. FURZEMAN," where the Lord Chief Justice a few days before refused to
try a similar case, was cited: but Mr. Justice HOLROYD thought, that as a wager
on a horse race, if above the value of 10L., had been holden illegal within the
statute of Anne, the plaintiff was entitled to recover his deposit at all
events, and that consequently, on proof of the deposit and demand, he was
entitled to a verdict; but the learned Judge refused to enter into any inquiry
whether the wagers had been won or lost. The jury accordingly returned a verdict
for the plaintiff - Damages 25L.

Mr. PATTESON now moved for a rule to show cause why the verdict should not be
set aside, and a nonsuit entered. He felt that after the case of "CLAYTON v.
JENNINGS," he could not hope successfully to contend that a wager on a
horse-race for a sum above 10L. was not illegal, though the horse-race itself
were legal; but he contended that the learned Judge ought not to have tried the
cause. It was most important to the suitors of the Court that a uniformity of
decision and practice should prevail on this subject, in order that they might
know whether they should bring actions or forbear in cases of this nature. Now,
on the one hand, there were authorities deciding that the parties to an illegal
wager might at any time demand and recover their stakes from the individual to
whom they were intrusted; and, on the other, several learned judges had declined
to try causes when brought into Court, for the deposit. At all events, as one of
these wagers, being for less than 10L., was legal, the learned Judge ought to
have received the evidence which the defendant was ready to adduce - that the
plaintiff's opponent was the winner.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE said, that it was a very different question, whether a
Judge should refrain from trying a particular cause, and whether, after he had
tried it, the Court would disturb the verdict. In this instance, Mr. Justice
HOLROYD thought that he could to a certain extent try the case, without entering
into the question whether the race was lost or won; and having tried it, there
was no doubt that the result was correct, unless, perhaps, as to the wager of
5L.; and before a rule was granted to reduce the verdict to that extent, inquiry
should be made if the plaintiff would not consent to abandon that small sum.

Mr. Justice BAYLEY said he hoped that a judge might legally exercise a
discretion in cases of this nature, as to those which he would and those which
he would not try; if not, he had sinned in two instances on the last circuit.
They were actions on very idle wagers, which would have occupied a large portion
of time, during which they would have detained the jury from their homes, and
have delayed other suitors, to their great inconvemience and expense. He had
therefore passed them over; but he did not think this particular case came
within the principle on which he had acted.

Mr. Justice HOLROYD and Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE concurred; and consequently the
rule was refused, with leave to Mr. PATTESON to mention the case again, if the
plaintiff should refuse to abandon the 5L.