09 Nov 1844 Court of Queen's Bench - Cumberland and Westmorland Newspaper Transcriptions

09 Nov 1844 Court of Queen's Bench

WEBSTER v. WILSON.

This was an action of assault. The plaintiff was an inhabitant of the town
of Kendal, being on the burgess list of that borough of which the defendant
was, in the year 1843, the mayor. The cause was tried at the last assizes
for Westmoreland, before the LORD CHIEF BARON, when a verdict was entered
for the defendant.

MR. KNOWLES now moved for a rule to show cause why this verdict should not
be set aside, and a vedict entered for the plaintiff. He moved on two
grounds - first, that the learned LORD CHIEF BARON had misdirected the jury;
and, secondly, that even on the direction of the learned judge, the verdict
returned by the jury was in substance a verdict for the plaintiff, and ought
so to have been entered.

The circumstances of the case were these:

In the month of November, 1843, there had been the annual election of town
councillors for the borough, and a partner of the defendant, who was at that
time mayor of the borough, was a candidate for one of the wards of the
borough. There was a contested election, and the defendant hired a small
room, which he converted into a polling booth.

There was a man named HULLEY who was going up to vote, and who was
accompanied by the plaintiff. HULLEY was undoubtedly at the time a little
in liquor, but he was not in the least degree riotous or noisy. There was
not a pretence for saying that he had in any way misconducted himself.

The defendant had put up a notice that no one but the person actually giving
the vote should be in the room. HULLY was going to vote against STOCK. The
plaintiff accompanied him to the voting room, went into it, and stood in the
centre of it, but never uttered a word, nor did any act which could call for
the interference of the mayor's authority. The mayor, however, ordered him
out of the room, observing that it was not an open court.

The plaintiff refused to go, observing that it was an open court, on which
the defendant put his own order into execution, and turned the plaintiff out
of the room. It was for this act of assault that the action was brought.

When these facts had been proved at the trial, MR. DUNDAS, who appeared for
the defendant, and who called the mayor a judge sitting in his own court,
contended that as such he had the absolute right to govern the proceedings
of his own court, was authorised to order the plaintiff out, and to turn him
out if he disobeyed the order.

The LORD CHIEF BARON without allowing the case to go to the jury, said that
the defendant's counsel was entitled to have his opinion in point of law,
and then added that the defendant had a right to hire a room; and that
being so, he had also the right to regulate the proceedings in it.

He then said to the jurors, "If you think that he made reasonable
arrangements for conducting the business of the day, you will find a verdict
in his favour."

As no explanation was given to the jurors of what reasonable arrangements
meant, an objection was made on that account, and his lordship said that by
that expression he referred to the notice and to the smallness of the room.

The jurors retired, andn then brought in a verdict declaring that they
thought the arrangements not proper, and that the plaintiff had a right to
be there. The reasonableness of the arrangements was thus expressly
excluded, and the verdict was in substance a verdict for the plaintiff.

The LORD CHIEF BARON said he would take down the verdict as it was actually
delivered, but he directed it to be entered as a verdict for the defendant.

The learned counsel referred to the 34th, 36th, and 43d sections of the
Municipal Corporation Reform Act, and also to several cases, to show that
the plaintiff had a right to be in the room at the time of the election.

LORD DENMAN: You are entitled to a rule.
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